By Olga Oliker
An exam of the problems confronted via the Russian army in planningand engaging in city operations in Chechnya.Russian and insurgent army forces fought to manage the Chechen urban ofGrozny within the winters of 1994_1995 and 1999_2000, in addition to clashing insmaller cities and villages. the writer examines either Russian and rebeltactics and operations in these battles, targeting how and why thecombatants_ techniques replaced over the years. The learn concludes that whilethe Russian army used to be capable of considerably enhance its skill to carryout a few key initiatives within the five-year period among the wars, otherimportant missions--particularly within the city realm--were overlooked, largelyin the idea that the city venture may be kept away from. This consciousdecision to not organize for a so much annoying battlefield met withdevastating effects, a lesson the U.S. will be good served tostudy.