Read e-book online Designing Democracy: Ideas for Better Rules PDF

By Hans A. Gersbach

ISBN-10: 3540224025

ISBN-13: 9783540224020

ISBN-10: 3540266984

ISBN-13: 9783540266983

This e-book provides a few principles for drawing up new principles to enhance the functioning of democracies. the 1st half examines methods of mixing incentive contracts with democratic elections. one of these really appropriate blend can alleviate quite a lot of political disasters with no impairing the rules on which democracies are based. the second one half provides new principles for decision-making, agendas and schedule settings that may go beyond the constraints of winning democracies in attaining fascinating results. An instance is versatile majority ideas the place the scale of the bulk relies on the idea. The e-book includes a chain of straightforward types and intuitive causes of the implications they yield.

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2 The Model We consider the voters' problem of trying to motivate an elected politician. The voters and the politician are assumed to be riskneutral. There are two periods. In the first period, the incumbent 56 4. Reelection Thresholds has to exert eflfort e on a task T, which for example could be the reform of the judiciary system. ^ For simplicity, we assume h = e. 1) The voters make their reelection decision dependent on their utility. From the perspective of the first period, however, the election at the beginning of the second period can be afl^ected by many other factors than the realized benefit.

If the public does not or cannot commit itself, any incentive contract which involves transfers from the public to politicians would lead to zero reelection and thus to STP. One solution to this problem is to make the incentive contract for a politician binding as soon as he stands for reelection, regardless of whether he will remain in office. Such "golden parachute" clauses in incentive contracts could solve the time-inconsistency problem inherent in the voters' reelection decision. But there is still the problem that politicians may try to demand excessive transfers once elected.

28) Because of Si < 62 we have: U^(P, RE) > Ut(p, RE). 29) Candidate 2 has a strict preference for LTP if elected, in contrast to the indiflTerence as to LTP and S T P of candidate 1 if elected. 3. First, suppose that candidate 2 deviates and offers C2{^2) with ^2 > /3. 8 Appendix 51 elected; this, in turn, is only a best response for voters if candidate 1 chooses LTP when elected and reelected. This requires that the following inequality holds: Ul^i^, RE) > U^{NRE) By construction U[(^,RE) = U^{NRE).

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Designing Democracy: Ideas for Better Rules by Hans A. Gersbach


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